The answer is "yes" as the Sixth Circuit reiterated recently in Denoma v Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, No 14-4058 (September 14, 2015). The court here reversed a summary judgment as to the plaintiff's failure-to-promote gender discrimination claim.
In support of her claim, the plaintiff had cited testimony from two coworkers, Clancy and George, regarding the consistent and persistent favoritism that their supervisor showed toward male employees. The testimony was particularly important, because the Sixth Circuit when assessing the pretext element of a failure-to-promote claim; where the plaintiff's qualifications or at least equal or slightly better, he or she is required to present evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere in the workplace; conversely, a plaintiff presenting evidence of clearly superior qualifications negates the need to present other evidence of discrimination.
The Sixth Circuit observed as follows regarding Denoma's evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere in the workplace:
As discussed earlier, Clancy and George testified that they believed Appellant's opportunity for advancement was limited by her gender or by her exclusion from a gendered in-group. We have held that non-decision-makers may provide circumstantial evidence of discrimination by opining the employees membership of a protected class way role in employment decision. See Hopson v Daimler Chrysler Corp, 306 F3d 427, 437 (6th Cir 2002) (holding that a manager provide circumstantial evidence of discrimination by testifying at his deposition that he believed the plaintiff's race was a factor in the company's decision not to promote him, even though the manager was not involved in the decision); Carter v University of Toledo, 349 F3d 269, 271-72, 274-76 (6th Cir 2003) (holding that a black plaintiff had created a genuine issue of fact on the pretext issue by testifying that a university vice Provost, when asked by the plaintiff whether her contract would be renewed, so this appeared to not want to employ black professors). Here, neither Clancy nor George specifically opined that appellant's application for the [ ] position was rejected due to her gender. Their opinions' lack of specificity detracts from their probative value regarding the reasons for Appellant's non-promotion, but does not render them immaterial.
