Retaliation cases require plaintiffs to establish a causative link between some protected activity and the retaliatory adverse employment action. Temporal proximity is one way to do so, the closer in time of the two the better and persuasive. Post hoc ergo propter hoc. But how much is to much time? Six months? More than six months? The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Sharp v. Akers Plant Services, where it reversed a summary judgment, again emphasized that more than six months is not too much time:
our precedent expressly rejects the district court's position that a span of more than six months between protected activity and adverse action categorically precludes causation.
The Sixth Circuit's unanimous opinion was authored by Circuit Judge Deborah Cook and joined by Circuit Judge Julia Gibbons and visiting District Judge James S. Gwin of the Northern District of Ohio, a panel that would ordinarily be viewed as not favorable toward an employment discrimination plaintiff appealing a summary judgment.
The precedents cited by the Sixth Circuit were several years old: Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F3d 324, 335 (6th Cir 2007); Harrison v. Metro Govt of Nashville & Davidson County, 80 F3d 1107, 1118-19 (6th Cir 1996)(holding that evidence supported a prima facie case of causation where the alleged retaliation occurred one year and three months after the protected activity), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Jackson v Quanex Corp, 191 F3d 647, 667 n 6 (6th Cir 1999).
This was the second time that Tommy Sharp has had the Sixth Circuit reverse a summary judgment granted by the district judge in Louisville. See Sharp v Aker Plant Services, 726 F3d 789 (6th Cir 2013).
