Apparently dissatisfied with the outcome of proceedings as to a workers compensation claim, Nissan fabricated the existence of a work restriction for the employee, then concluded, in view of this fabricated work restriction, that it had no position he was physically able to perform and terminated his employment. This violated the Americans with Disabilities Actas a matter of law the Sixth Circuit ruled in Jones v. Nissan North America, No 09-5786 (August 18, 2011), a remarkable decision in which the Court overrode an adverse jury verdict for the plaintiff, reversed and ordered that judgment as to liability be entered on the employee's behalf.
Mark Jones was a long-time production laborer at Nissan's plant in Smyrna, Tennessee. In April 2003, Jones injured his right elbow, was later diagnosed with "tennis elbow" for which he had successful surgery in September 2004 and was returned to work with no restrictions in January 2005. Related to the elbow injury he was assigned and impairment rating of 3%. He continued working over the next year and a half; his supervisor found in be a hard worker and Jones never asked for any type of accommodation or indicated that he was having any difficulty performing his job duties.
In June 2006, Jones is workers compensation claim regarding his elbow injury was tried in Chancery Court. The Chancellor found that Joan suffered from a 30% vocational disability, noting that Jones was suffering continuing difficulties because of the injury to his elbow.
The award of workers compensation benefits, as the Sixth Circuit noted, "was higher than Nissan was expecting." Nissan resolved that works restrictions should be imposed on Jones to include no lifting, no use of power tools and no use of hand tools. Event concluded that it had no jobs available for Jones consistent with those restrictions, and placed them on unpaid medical leave. Nissan asked Jones to sign a form indicating that he was restricted from lifting, using power tools and using hand tools but he declined, explaining "I was not on any restrictions, I could do my job, and I was able to do my job." Jones also declined to follow Nissan suggestion that he apply for long-term disability benefits. Subsequently, after Nissan had run Jones out of his workforce, he accepted employment with another company, a move that provoked Nissan to formally terminate his employment.
Jones filed suit claiming that the termination of his employment violated both the Americans with disabilities act and Tennessee state law. He claimed not that he actually was disabled but that he was so regarded by Nissan. The essence of his claim was that Nissan fabricated the work restrictions regarding lifting and his use of power and hand tools and therefore regarded him as disabled, because it regarded him as substantially limited in and performing the major life activities of lifting in performing manual task, which includes the use of hand tools and power tools. See Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 2007)( lifting a major life activity); Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 2001) (ability to perform manual task including using "hand power tools" and "air vibrating power tools" is a major life activity).
Nissan claimed that it had imposed the restrictions on Jones because it was required to do so by the Chancellor's order in Jones' workers compensation case. The Sixth Circuit rejected this out of hand noting, among other things, that "Nissan employees continually revised the Chancellor's findings without regard to what the Chancellor actually stated" and imposed the hand tool restriction "despite the fact that the Chancellor did not make a single finding with regard to Jones's ability to use hand tools and his job."
The Sixth Circuit ruled further that Nissan's position was undercut by its failure to take "any steps to ascertain Jones's actual medical condition" and further that "Nissan acknowledged that it conducted no such inquiry because it determined that it did not matter whether Jones was medically disabled." The court stressed that it is prior holding in Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 200), required an employer to conduct an "individualized inquiry" into an employee's actual medical condition that could not be excused by simply relying on a third-party's assessment that an employee is disabled.
The Court concluded its analysis as follows:
The question then is whether when an employer takes action based on a third party's judgment regarding the employee's physical ability to perform the job, it is excused from making an individualized inquiry if it perceives that is required to follow the third party's judgment without regard to the accuracy of that judgment. Nissan argues that in such a case the employer is not acting based on prejudice, myths or preconceived notions about an employee's physical abilities, but rather on its understanding, albeit possibly mistaken, of its obligations separate and apart from its perceptions of the employee's physical capabilities. Nissan thus seeks refuge behind the chancellor's conclusions by casting them as legal, rather than medical, conclusions. But the chancellor's statements were neither; there were findings in support of the chancellor's ruling. In making these findings, the chancellor did not impose restrictions on Jones; the chancellor simply stated, in response to Nissan's counsel's request for clarification, what the chancellor found to be the injuries affect on Jones's ability to perform various tasks. Whether this is labeled as a medical determination of some other type of determination, this determination concerns Jones's physical ability to perform his job. Were employers permitted to infer an inability to do the job based on workers' compensation findings of fact, the purposes of the ADA would be undermined. Although Nissan disavows sharing the chancellor's view of Jones's limitations, it nevertheless drew unfounded inferences from those findings, leading it to impose unsupported medical restrictions on Jones. This constitutes discrimination under the ADA.
From that concluson the Sixth Circuit overrode the jury's verdict in Nissan's favor, reversed and ordered that judgment in Jones' favor be entered by the district court.
Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com
