The Sixth Circuit, in the type of ruling so rare as to suggest somewhere the dodo bird lives on, reversed a jury trial conviction based on a Confrontation Clause violation caused by the district court’s undue limits on the defense’s cross-examination of the key government witness. The case is United States v. Quincy Taylor (February 7, 2025).
The government’s key witness, William Powell, a freight hauler, testified that he saw defendant Quincy Taylor’s car flipp over into a ditch beside a highway. According to Howell, Taylor hid a small bag by the roadside before catching a ride and driving off. Howell pointed out the bag when police arrived. “Howell’s testimony was the only evidence presented at trial that connected Taylor to the bag.” The bag contained cocaine, a loaded revolver and ammunition. Taylor would be charged and convicted of drug trafficking and firearms offenses.
Howell, for his part, got into criminal law trouble of his own prior to the trial. Not long after the incident involving Taylor, Howell was charged in state court with felony drug possession and two misdemeanors. He later met with law enforcement regarding the case against Taylor, and “one agent told Howell to talk to his lawyer because it was possible to receive a benefit for assisting law enforcement.”
Still later, Howell pleaded guilty to the drug possession felony and the misdemeanor charges and entered into a pre-trial diversion agreement. A diversion agreement in state court usually means that the plea will be vacated and the charges dismissed if the defendant stays out of trouble for a specific period of time, usually a year. The Sixth Circuit opinion does not indicate the terms of Howell's diversion agreement. In any event, Howell broke that agreement less than two months later when he was charged in state court with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm. According to Taylor’s counsel, the state prosecutor conveyed to the government a willingness to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge and revocation of the diversion agreement in part because Howell was cooperating with the federal government regarding Taylor’s prosecution. The federal prosecutor asserted that the state prosecutor’s willingness was not relayed to Howell.
Prior to trial the district court, Chief Judge Danny C. Reeves of the Eastern District of Kentucky, ruled that Taylor could ask Howell if he had any felony convictions but could go no further unless Howell “open[ed] the door to such questioning.” The district court excluded any questions about Howell’s pending felon-in-possession charge. After trial started, defense counsel urged that questions regarding Howell’s pending charge were the proper subject of cross-examination based on the state prosecutor’s willingness to dismiss that pending charge and forgo revocation of the diversion agreement based on Howell's cooperation. But the district court stood by its ruling, “finding an insufficient ‘showing of bias to allow it to come in,’ and finding that the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403.”
Taylor was convicted and received a sentence of 360 months.
The Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Confrontation Clause was violated by the limits that the district court placed on cross-examination of Howell. The court identified three subjects that Taylor sought to explore during cross-examination: (1) Howell’s felony drug conviction, (2) Howell’s then-pending felon-in-possession charge, and, (3) potential benefits to Howell for his testimony. The court observed that “Taylor’s desire to cross-examine Howell about his felon-in-possession charge and potential benefits went to Howell’s bias and motivation for testifying." It noted that Howell appeared to be in line to not only have the felon-in-possession charge dropped based on his cooperation for the government but also the revocation of the diversion agreement dropped. “Whether preferential treatment influences a witnesses testimony constitutes ‘core impeachment evidence.’” United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 918 (6th Cir. 2024).
“A criminal defendant’s inquiry into the issues of motive, bias, and prejudice is not limited to establishing the mere fact of a witnesses prior conviction; defense counsel may also question a witness concerning why he is biased.” The district court’s prohibition on Taylor from asking about Howell’s pending felon-in-possession charge, its potential impact on the diversion agreement he received for his felony conviction, and the state prosecutor’s willingness to dismiss the charge based on house cooperation and Taylor’s prosecution deprived a jury of vital information necessary to assess Howell’s bias or motive for testifying.
The Sixth Circuit summarized its ruling as follows:
In sum, Taylor sought to cross-examine Howell about his bias and motive for testifying. Because of the district court’s limitations on cross-examination, the jury lacked enough information to make ‘an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [Howell’s] testimony.’ And the government’s interest in excluding the evidence did not outweigh Taylor’s ‘paramount’interest in exploring Howell’s potential bias. The district court thus violated Taylor’s confrontation right when it limited his ability to cross-examine Howell about his potential bias and motive in testifying.
The court then concluded that the error could not be judged harmless.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion was authored by Judge Andre Mathis and joined by Judges Guy Cole and Helene White.
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