Kentucky Employment Law Blog

Deputies' Report of Sheriff's Eavesdropping Addressed Matter of Public Concern and Was Protected by First Amendment

"[W]hen public employees allege that government officials break the law, their speech addresses a matter of public concern" and is entitled to First Amendment protection the Sixth Circuit recently reiterated in Kiessel v. Leelaneau County, No. 10-2602 (January 31, 2012).  The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to a sheriff sued by three former deputy sheriffs, who claimed they were fired in retaliation for reporting to the FBI and Michigan state police that the sheriff was eavesdropping illegally on their phone calls.

Events unfolded as follows. In January 2008, two deputy sheriffs, Kiessel and Lamb, reported to the FBI and state police that the sheriff, Mike Oltersdorf, was eavesdropping on their phone calls. In response, the sheriff got an opinion from the Michigan Attorney General stating that his actions were not illegal. In the public debate that followed, two of the deputy sheriffs wrote a letter to the editor stating the sheriff committed "misconduct" and "unlawful actions" in eavesdropping. Sixth months later the sheriff suspended them for making "false public accusations." Another six months later, the sheriff fired the deputies. They, in turn, sued claiming among other things violation of their First Amendment rights. A district court denied qualified immunity to the sheriff, who appealed.

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion written by district judge Amul R. Thapar, affirmed and noted the First Amendment protections that attached to the deputies' letter to the editor:

• "Statements exposing possible corruption in a police department are exactly the type of statements that demand strong First Amendment protection." See v. City of Elyria, 502 F3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2007)
  
  
• "Certainly speech which questions the credibility of the Sheriff's Department ... is a matter of public concern." Lucas v. Monroe County, 203 F3d 964, 974 n. 5 (6th Cir. 2000)
  
  
• "Public interest is near its zenith when ensuring that public organizations are being operated in accordance with the law." Marohnic v. Walker, 800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1986)
  
  
• "accusations of corruption in a police department are 'exactly the type of statements that demand strong First Amendment protections.'" Elyria, 502 F.3d at 493.

Interestingly, the court gave short shrift to the sheriff's argument that he could reasonably have believed that the deputy sheriffs knowingly or recklessly made false statements in their newspaper letter, since the Michigan Attorney General said the sheriff's eavesdropping was legal: "The sheriff knew the plaintiffs had reported the eavesdropping to the FBI as well as to the Michigan State Police, suggesting the plaintiffs believed that the Sheriff's Office broke both federal and state laws. The Attorney General's opinion dealt only with the legality of the eavesdropping under state law, so a reasonable official could not have relied on the opinion to conclude that the plaintiffs falsely accused the sheriff of violating federal law."

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com 

 

 

McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework Applicable to False Claims Act Retaliation Claims, First Circuit Rules

The False Claims Act was amended by Congress in 2009 and its anti-retaliation provision expanded. It provides as follows:  

Any employee . . . shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make [him] . . . whole, if that employee . . . is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against . . . because of lawful acts done by the employee . . . in furtherance of an action under this section. 31 USC sec. 3730(h)(1).

The First Circuit ruled recently in Harrington v. Aggregate Resources, No. 11-1511 (Feb. 7, 2012), that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applied to retaliation claims under the False Claims Act. This was the first officially reported appellate decision on this point. The Sixth Circuit made a similar ruling in an unpublished decision,  Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 F.App'x 341, 346 (6th Cir. 2007).

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com 

What Is Pretext? An Amalgam of Irregularities, Inconsistencies and Implausibilities

"Pretext" in employment discrimination and retaliation cases is the term applicable to whether the explanation offered by the employer for its adverse action toward the employee can be credited. Where that explanation is shown to be pretextual, a powerful inference of unlawful motive and purpose arises as the Supreme Court explained in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing:

Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.  … the trier of fact can reasonable infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.  Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." 

 Most often, pretext is shown by an amalgam of irregularities, inconsistencies and impossibilities that arise from and attached to the employer's explanation. The recent First Circuit decision in Harrington v. Aggregate Resources, No 11-1511 (Feb. 7, 2012), illustrates aptly this point.

The plaintiff, Harrington, was a truck driver for Aggregate Resources, which was a concrete supplier to Boston's "Big Dig" project. Harrington learned that the company was providing substandard concrete. Harrington and another employee filed a sealed action under the False Claims Act regarding this fraudulent conduct. For reasons unexplained in the decision Harrington's identity as a whistleblower became known to the company. Eventually, the Justice Department reached a negotiated settlement for several million dollars, one to which Harrington was a party as a False Claims Act whistleblower.

The First Circuit's opinion suggests that Harrington's relationship with his employer deterioriated once his whistleblower status became known to it. Harrington, upon returning to work after an absence on account of illness, was immediately confronted with the demand that he submit to a "return-to-work" physical and drug test. The company dropped the demand after Harrington cited his union contract. Then the company asserted that Harrington had to take a drug test, because he had tested positive for cocaine some years earlier. A union business agent interceded and the company backed down again.

Amazingly or coincidentally, Harrington was informed when he next reported to work that his name appeared on a third-party generated list to take a random drug test. Harrington complied and went on with his work. A few days later, he was told that his urine sample had yielded an inconclusive result and that he was required to submit to another test. Standard practice required that a urine sample the "split" with one part being tested and the other part being held in reserve. Harrington asked that his "split" sample be used. Again amazingly or coincidentally, he was told that "split" sample had been lost and was unavailable. Harrington then declined to submit to another drug test. The next day he signed the settlement agreement in the False Claims Act case. The day after that the employer fired him for refusing to take a drug test. After he was fired, Harrington filed suit claiming that his termination violated the anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 USC § 3730. The district court granted the employer summary judgment and Harrington appeal.

The First Circuit determined that the case turned on the issue of pretext. It concluded that the amalgam of inconsistencies, implausibilities and irregularities yielded a fact issue and reversal of the summary judgment as the Court explained:

• “[W]eaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffer [ ]” can give rise to an inference of pretext. So can deviations from standard procedures, the sequence of occurrences leading up to a challenged decision, and close temporal proximity between relevant events.
  
  
•  "To begin, the ink was still wet on the settlement agreement" when Harrington was fired. "Such close temporal proximity strongly suggests retaliation."
  
  
• "The record casts substantial doubt on whether Aggregate, at several points, was following its own drug testing protocol."
  
  
• When Harrington "sought to return to work after several days off, Aggregate insisted that he take a drug test. The appellant objected, citing the union contract. Aggregate did not press the matter, and the record contains no explanation for this."
  
  
• "Following its initial botched attempt to get a drug test, Aggregate tried a new approach. This time, it told [Harrington] that he needed to take a follow-up drug test because of a positive test result in 2005. [Harrington] again challenged Aggregate's demand and brought the matter to the attention of the union's business agent. Aggregate relented, and there is no clear evidence indicating that it had a right to impose this requirement."
  
  
• "The events that occurred on the day that the appellant returned to work also lend sustenance to an inference of pretext. On that day, the appellant was singled out for a drug test. Aggregate avers that he was selected at random by a third-party testing company. Coincidences happen, but this sequence of events raises eyebrows. This eyebrow-raising effect is heightened by the fact that Aggregate never produced an affidavit or other statement from its third-party contractor as to when or how the appellant was chosen. Moreover, the record contains a data sheet showing the test results. This data sheet did not describe the test as “random,” but as a “follow-up” drug test."
  
  
• The whereabouts of Harrington's "split" sample "contributes to the air of mystery." The employer's human resources director testified that "he did not know whether the split was lost. He added that standard testing procedures made that eventuality highly unlikely. To compound the uncertainty, the record contains no evidence about the split from the third-party testing firm."
  
  
• "In retaliation cases, the whole is sometimes greater than the sum of the parts. Here, for example, the bits and pieces of evidence recounted above, taken collectively, have significant probative value. After all, irregularities in an employer's dealings with an employee who has fallen out of favor can support a reasonable inference of pretext. See, e.g., Collazo, 617 F.3d at 52; Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir.2006); Garrett v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir.2002). Moreover, the fact that Aggregate repeatedly insisted on a drug test for spurious reasons contributes to the inference of pretext. Because the appellant had tested positive for cocaine in 2005, a jury could infer that Aggregate focused on this weak point in his employment history as a convenient way of getting rid of him."
  
  

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com 

 

 

What Must a Credit Union Whistleblower Prove In a Retaliation Case?

The Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. sec. 1790b, makes it unlawful to retaliate against a whistleblower who engages in certain protected activity. The statute states as follows:

No insured credit union may discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to the request of the employee) provided information to the [National Credit Union Administration] Board or the Attorney General regarding any possible violation of any law or regulation by the credit union or any director, officer, or employee of the credit union.

The Fifth Circuit recently identified in Schroeder v. Greater New Orleans Federal Credit Union, No. 10-31169 (December 19, 2011), the elements of a cause of action for violation of this statute as follows: (1) that the plaintiff-employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the employer credit union took adverse employment action against him or her; and, (3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

The Fifth Circuit followed earlier decisions by the First Circuit, Simas v. First Citizens Federal Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1999), and the Sixth Circuit, McNett v Hardin Community Federal Credit Union, 118 Fed.Appx. 960 (6th Cir. 2004), for this holding.  

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com 

RICO Claims Arise From Retaliation Against Corporate Whistleblower, Seventh Circuit Rules

A tax employee, who claimed that he was fired in retaliation for his whistleblowing reports of tax fraud, may pursue claims and remedies under the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. secs. 1962(c), (d), the Seventh Circuit ruled recently in DeGuelle v. Camilli, No. 10-2172 (7th Cir., December 15, 2011).  The ruling reversed a district court's dismissal of the case.

Michael DeGuelle was employed in the tax department of S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., a company with over 120,000 employees world-wide. He learned that the company had received $5 million plus in improper foreign tax credits due to an IRS auditing error. He reported the discovery to his supervisor, Wenzel, who told him to destroy records to keep the IRS from finding out the truth and to alter some relevant returns.  This was the first instance, according to the court's opinion, where records were altered or destroyed and falsified returns mailed to the IRS. The court's opinion recites a number of disturbing instances and transactions that followed in the next few years.

DeGuelle, according to the court's opinion, met with much grief for bringing to light the company's wrongdoing.  His supervisor, Wenzel, became highly antagonistic toward him and, at times, physically aggressive.  DeGuelle received a procedurally irregular and highly negative mid-year performance review that followed only a few months his receipt of an award for outstanding job performance, had the company's human resources department acknowledge that his negative review was in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities, and received an offer to have his attorney's fees paid in exchange for signing a release of claims and confidentiality agreement the same day that he said that he would file a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaint with the Department of Labor.  DeGuelle did file a complaint with the DOL and attached financial statements, tax documents and internal emails to his complaint.  Subsequently, he was offered one year salary in exchange for his resignation, release of all claims and signing of a confidentiality agreement.  Subsequently and after DeGuelle declined the resignation etc. offer, he was fired for wrongfully taking and disclosing company documents and for being untruthful during the company's investigation of his reports.  

DeGuelle filed suit following his termination and pleaded various claims including two under RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). The district court dismissed his claims on the grounds that the retaliation against DeGuelle was unrelated to his reports of alleged tax fraud by his employer. This remarkably erroneous ruling was met with strong criticism by the Seventh Circuit:

When an employer retaliates against an employee, there is always an underlying motivation. In this case, for example, the motivation was to retaliate against DeGuelle for disclosing the tax scheme. Retaliatory acts are inherently connected to the underlying wrongdoing exposed by the whistleblower. Although there may not be the same victims or results, in most cases retaliatory acts and the underlying scheme "are interreleated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."  

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reinstated DeGuelle's RICO claims and rejected decisions by other courts that have not permitted RICO claims in similar circumstances.  

Although the court's opinion is not clear exactly what company documents the employer claimed that DeGuelle wrongfully possessed and/or disclosed, if those documents are the ones that DeGuelle tendered with his whistleblower complaint to the Department of Labor, the company's reliance on that disclosure may raise some of the issues discussed in an earlier post on this blog, Can A Policy Violation Also Be Protected Activity?

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com 

Can A Policy Violation Also Be Protected Activity?

Can a policy violation also be protected activity? Here's the scenario: a client in an employment discrimination case secretly tape-records conversations and discussions in her workplace because she believes she is being subjected to gender discrimination (such a recording would be legal in Kentucky because the client, the recorder, consents to the recording). But the employer has a policy forbidding tape-recording in the workplace. After the client is fired and files a gender discrimination suit, the employer learns of the recordings and contends that her remedies should be limited because this violation of policy would have justified her firing. This is known as the after-acquired evidence doctrine discussed by the Supreme Court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner, 513 U.S. 352 (1995). Some courts recognize the problems that employers raise for themselves in making arguments like this.

In Loudermilk v. Best Pallet, LLC, 636 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2011), the plaintiff had raised numerous complaints about discriminatory treatment in the workplace.  He took some photos for purposes of supporting his complaints.  The employer, after much floundering around, eventually claimed that it fired the plaintiff for taking the photos. The Seventh Circuit, which reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, took a dim view of the employer's argument:

Best Pallet says that it fired Loudermilk not because of the note's content, but because he had taken pictures of the work site, in violation of company policy. But it did not give thatexplanation to Loudermilk—or for that matter the EEOC. Best Pallet told the agency that it let Loudermilk go as part of a reduction in force (though Loudermilk's name was not on a list of workers that had been prepared for that purpose). In court it abandoned that explanation and contended that Loudermilk had resigned, or that his departure was a "mutual decision." Since Loudermilk says that he did not resign, that explanation can't prevail at the summary judgment stage. This led to the "fired for photography" contention, which is problematic not only because the no-photography policy may have been cooked up after the fact, but also because it comes close to conceding retaliation. 

In Heller v. Champion Int'l Corp., 891 F.2d 432 (2nd Cir. 1989), the employer argued that it was justified in firing the plaintiff, regardless of the terms of any implied contract, because he had been disloyal by taping conversations with company personnel.  The Second Circuit rejected this argument and, noting that the plaintiff also contended that he was a victim of age discrimination, observed as follows:

At the time the events of this lawsuit were unfolding, Heller believed that Champion was not only in the process of breaking its promises to him, but that it was also discriminating against him because of his age. His surreptitious tape-recording, to be sure, represents a kind of "disloyalty" to the company, but not necessarily the kind of disloyalty that under these circumstances would warrant dismissal as a matter of law. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits employers from discharging individuals because they have "participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter."

Some courts have reached different conclusions and all have cautioned that there are limits on what an employee may do to gather evidence to bolster their discrimination complaints. The circumstances of each case, accordingly, will have to be probed and considered carefully.

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com

Failure to Disclose Retaliatory Motive Leaves Causation Chain Intact

To prove a retaliation claim a plaintiff must show a link between his or her protected activity and the adverse employment action taken against them. A common defense raised by employers is that the causation link was broken by the action of a third party or entity, which the employer asserts had no retaliatory motive whatsoever.  A police department's efforts to do so was discussed in a recent post, Police Disciplinary Board's Rubberstamp Does Not Break the Causation Chain of Supervisor's Retaliation, Third Circuit Rules. This scenario was again presented in the First Circuit's recent decision in Tuli v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, No 08-2026, 09-1597, 09-1603, 09-1731 (August 29, 2011).

Dr. Sagun Tuli, a female neurosurgeon at Boston' prestigious Brigham & Women's Hospital, was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, as a previous post discussed, Accumulated Effect of Incidents of Humiliating, Offensive Comments Directed at Women and Work-Sabotaging Pranks, Taken Together, Can Constitute a Hostile Work Environment, First Circuit Rules.

Dr. Tuli also presented a retaliation claim the basis for which were numerous prior reports by her of sexually hostile and inappropriate conduct and statements by her supervisor, a Dr. Arthur Day, and a colleague, a Dr. Dong Kim. These reports were made to, among others, Dr. Anthony Whittemore, the hospital's medical director.  Dr. Tuli also expressed concerns with some patient care issues by Dr. Day. 

Eventually, Dr. Day, as Dr. Tuli's supervisor, made a presentation to the hospital's credentials committee that Dr. Tuli had emotional problems and was in need of anger management counselling.  The credentials committee conditioned renewal of Dr. Tuli's practice privileges on her completion of a counselling program. Subsequently, in response to a committee demand for more specific information, Dr. Whittemore re-presented Dr. Tuli's case, providing a "somewhat more balanced opinion, but mostly rehashing the issues Day" had earlier discussed. Neither Whittemore nor Day informed the credentials committee of Tuli's reports and complaints about Day's sexual harassment of her or her concerns regarding patient care issues. The committee stood by its requirement that Dr. Tuli undergo counselling. This requirement is subject of another earlier post, Is Employer-Ordered Counselling An Adverse Employment Action?

Since Dr. Tuli claimed that the credentials committee's requirement that she undergo counselling was an adverse employment action, the issue was whether the causative link between her protected activity -- reporting a sexually hostile work environment -- was broken because, as the First Circuit noted, "there is no suggestion that individuals on or involved with the committee other than Day harbored any improper animus or acted with retaliatory motive in voting to compel Tuli to seek and follow an evaluation."

The existence of the causation link, of course, is a question of fact for the jury. The First Circuit ruled that its finding was well-supported by the evidence, explaining as follows:

     But Day represented the Hospital as the head of his department in presenting the case against Tuli, cf. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011), and Whittemore–-who knew the background--re-presented it without qualifying information about Day. Day presented the case even though he had been the subject of adverse critiques by Tuli of his own performance as part of her official responsibilities and Day was the subject of her complaints about Day's own wrongful conduct toward her. It was for the jury to decide whether the committee was misled by Day in a way that altered the outcome.

    Nor was the jury obliged to think the causal chain broken by the second round of review. Whittemore was himself relying in part on information from Day, and he did not tell the committee of the complaints that Tuli had made about Day; although some members were apparently aware of some of the background, it was not disclosed at the meeting. Two committee members testified that knowledge of the complaints against Day would have been "important information."

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com

Is Employer-Ordered Counselling an Adverse Employment Action?

For a retaliation claim to be actionable the employee must have suffered an "adverse employment action." The Supreme Court explained in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), would vary from case to case but would always be the type of action that "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." This principle was applied in the First Circuit's recent decision in Tuli v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, No 08-2026, 09-1597, 09-1603, 09-1731 (August 29, 2011).

Dr. Tuli, a female neurosurgeon at Boston's prestigious Brigham & Women's Hospital, was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment as discussed in a prior post, Accumulated Effect of Incidents of Humiliating, Offensive Comments Directed at Women and Work-Sabotaging Pranks, Taken Together, Can Constitute a Hostile Work Environment, First Circuit Rules. Dr. Tuli also claimed that she was retaliated against for complaining of and reporting the conduct that formed the basis of her hostile work environment claim. She cited an order from the hospital's credentials committee that she obtain anger management counselling as a condition of having her staff and practice credentials renewed as an adverse employment action.

The First Circuit regarded it as a difficult question, recognizing the hospital's legitimate interest in protecting its patients from a doctor that needs treatment or counselling. However, in the context of this case, the court ruled that the jury could properly have found the ordered counselling an adverse employment action, explaining as follows:

      Tuli provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the consequences of the obligatory counseling ordered by the Hospital--invasion of privacy, potential stigma, and possible impact on employment and licensing elsewhere--"might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Obligatory counseling is not a typical adverse action but the impact here could be deemed sufficient by the jury if the action was prompted by a retaliatory motive.

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com

Police Disciplinary Board's Rubberstamp Does Not Break the Causation Chain of Supervisor's Retaliation, Third Circuit Rules

Police officer Raymond Carnation, a white man, complained repeatedly of racial discrimination in the Philadelphia police department directed at his colleagues who were black.  He went through the proper channels but his reports were not well-received, and he was told, in essence, to shut up.  When he insisted on doing the right thing, his commander, a Captain William Colarulo, filed charges against him to get him fired.

Colarulo's charges against Carnation were heard by the police department's Police Board of Inquiry (PBI). The PBI accepted Colarulo's recommendation that Carnation be terminated and then the police commissioner signed off on Carnation's termination also.

After he was fired, Carnation filed suit, claiming that he was fired in violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions. A jury saw right through the police department's scheme: it awarded Carnation $2,000,000 in compensatory damages (which was reduced to $300,000 because of Title VII's damages cap), $208,781 in back pay and $46,560 in prejudgment interest.  The essential finding by the jury was that Colarulo filed charges against Carnation in retaliation for Carnation's opposition to racially discriminatory practices.

The city argued on appeal that the PBI's action broke the retaliatory chain of causation put in motion by Colarul0's filing of charges against Carnation. This required consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 SCt 1186 (2011). The Third Circuit rejected this argument because the PBI proceeding had at best minimal due process, the record reviewed by the police commissioner was limited and Carnation had a very limited right of appeal.  The Court further observed:

Even if the City had proven that the PBI was a truly independent body, this alone would not undermine the jury's determination, based on all the evidence, that there was a causal connection between Carnation's termination and his involvement in protected activity.

The Third Circuit decision is McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, No 10-3430 (August 17, 2011). Brian M. Purcelli of Newtown, Pennsylvania represented officer Carnation.

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com 

Oral Complaints of Overtime Violations Protected from Retaliation, Supreme Court Rules

Does the Fair Labor Standards Act's antiretaliation provision protect complaints of violations that are made orally? It does the Supreme Court ruled in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, No 09-834 (March 22, 2011).

The Fair Labor Standards Act establishes federal wage and hour requirements as well as overtime compensation requirements. A protected complaint regarding a possible violation of the law, the Court ruled, must provide "fair notice" of its intended substance and meet the following criteria:

a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected bythe statute and a call for their protection. This standard can be met, however, by oral complaints, as well as by written ones.

Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the Court's 6-2 majority; Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. 

Robert L. Abell
www.RobertAbellLaw.com